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Combining Actual  and Contingent Behavior
Data to  Model  Farmer Adoption  of Water
Quality Protection Practices
Joseph  C. Cooper
Using  farmer responses  to contingent  valuation  method  (CVM) survey  data in com-
bination  with actual  market  data from four watershed  regions  in the United  States,
this study estimates  the minimum incentive payments  a farmer would accept in order
to adopt more environmentally  friendly  "best management  practices"  (BMPs). Com-
bining actual market data with the CVM data adds information to the analysis, there-
by  most likely  increasing  the  reliability  of the results  compared  to  analyzing  the
contingent  behavior  survey  response  data  only.  Given  the  decision  to  adopt,  the
article  also  presents  a  pooled model  for  the number  of acres  enrolled  in the BMPs
as a function  of the  incentive payments.
Adoption  rates  predicted  with the  combined  data  model  are  significantly  higher
over a wide range  of offers  than those predicted using the traditional discrete choice
analysis with the hypothetical data only.  Hence,  using the traditional  CVM  analysis
results  to  determine payments  to  attain  a given level  of adoption may result in over-
payment.
Key  words:  best  management  practices,  contingent  valuation  method,  discrete
choice,  incentive  payments,  tobit,  water quality
Introduction
In response to increasing  public  concern  over agricultural  pollutants degrading  surface-
and  groundwater  supplies,  the  1990  Food,  Agriculture,  Conservation,  and  Trade  Act
(FACTA)  authorized  the  U.S. Department  of Agriculture  (USDA) to  initiate  the Water
Quality  Incentive  Program  (WQIP).  WQIP  is  administered  by  the  Natural  Resources
Conservation  Service  (NRCS)  through  the  Agricultural  Conservation  Program  (ACP).
Its  goal  is  to  mitigate  the  negative  impacts  of agricultural  activities  on  surface-  and
groundwater  supplies  by  using  stewardship  payments  and  technical  assistance  to  help
farmers  who  agree to implement  approved practices.  With these  incentives,  farmers are
encouraged  to  experiment  with  more  environmentally  benign production  practices  than
they would otherwise. In 1992 and  1993 the funding  levels for WQIP were $6.75 million
and  $15  million, respectively.  Currently,  farmers  in  a  small  number  of watersheds  are
eligible to enter the program.  However,  Sinner has  suggested making this type of incen-
tive payment program more  widely  available.
WQIP incentive payments  are not determined  through market interaction.  Instead, the
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payments  are essentially  fixed offer amounts.  As a result, a function modeling the prob-
ability of adoption  of a practice  as  a function  of the incentive  payment cannot be  esti-
mated  from current  market  data.  Without  this  function, the  government  can only  guess
at the  incentive payment  levels  necessary  to  achieve  desired  levels  of adoption.  Given
the  inability  to  estimate  this  function  from  market  data,  the  USDA  surveyed  farmers
currently  not using  the  "best  management  practices"  (BMPs)  on  whether  or not  they
would adopt the practices  given hypothetical  bid values per  acre. These  questions  were
written in the contingent valuation method  (CVM) format. Based on an analysis of these
results, it is then possible to model the probability of adoption of a practice as  a function
of the incentive payments.
However,  modeling this data using just the hypothetical  data ignores  some potentially
useful  information.  Specifically,  market  data on  the farmers'  responses  to no incentive
payments,  that  is, the  response  to  the  $0  bid  value  are left  out.1 The  vast majority  of
current  users  of the  BMPs  do  not  receive  incentive  payments  for using  the  practices.
Therefore,  we know  that  by definition,  the  current  (i.e.,  nonprogram) users  are  willing
to  accept  a  $0  incentive  payment per  acre  to  use  the practices.  If users  and  nonusers
have the same  utility function  and associated coefficients-as  they appear to for the data
sets used in this study-then  they  can be  combined together  in  a qualitative  dependent
variable regression  for determining  minimum willingness to accept (WTA),  thereby add-
ing  more  information  to  the  model  than  using  only  hypothetical  answers.2 This  study
combines  farmers'  actual  bid response data  with CVM  survey data  in a qualitative  de-
pendent variable regression,  thereby increasing  the  information  content in the  analysis.3
While previous research has combined revealed and stated preference  data for travel cost
method  modeling (Adamowicz,  Louviere, and Williams;  Craig, Boyce,  Criddle),  the au-
thor  is  not  aware  of any  published  work  in  the  CVM  literature  on  directly  pooling
hypothetical  and  actual  market data in estimation.
Theoretical Basis  for Estimating the Hypothetical  Model
While  the researcher could directly elicit from the current nonadopting farmer his  or her
minimum  WTA necessary  to  adopt the practice,  the referendum approach,  in which  the
respondent  is  asked  to  vote  yes  or  no on  some  action,  is  likely to  be  preferable  (U.S.
Department  of Commerce).  The dichotomous choice  (DC) form of CVM is used to take
this  approach.  Under  DC-CVM,  the  respondent  is  prompted  to  provide  a  yes  or  no
'The  WQIP program is  small enough  that none of the randomly  sampled farmers in the data  sets used here were enrolled
in the  program. Also  note that  insufficient  information  is available  to determine  the  number of farmers  in WQIP program
areas  who wanted  to adopt the practices  at the  currently offered incentive levels  of $10-$12  per acre.
2 On  the  other hand,  even  if  the  two  groups  are  somewhat  different,  combining  the  actual  users  and  contingent  users
together in  estimation should  still be  advantageous:  the  actual users  give  unbiased market  responses  to  the  $0 offer,  while
the responses to the hypothetical  bids may be subject to  the numerous  potential biases associated with CVM, such as strategic
bias.  Hence,  restricting the  coefficients  to  be  equal between  the two  groups  can  help  smooth  out  biases  in the  contingent
behavior  responses.  Of  course,  this restriction  will increase  bias  in the estimated  coefficients  of the  actual users,  but since
they already use  the BMPs at $0,  predicting their change in adoption  rates in response  to different bid levels is irrelevant.
3 Alternatively, the hypothetical  data  can be modeled in a bivariate probit with  a sample selection framework  in which the
hypothetical  data  are analyzed by  taking into account  the sample  selection bias (i.e.,  CVM data  are available only  for those
responding farmers  who do not  currently  use the practice,  and furthermore,  hypothetical  acreage  data  are available only  for
nonuser farmers who answer yes to  the CVM question). As the bivariate probit model predicts WTA and acreage  levels only
for hypothetical  users,  its results  are not directly  comparable  with  those in this article and,  hence,  is left out for brevity. A
working paper on  this subject is available  from the author.
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response to a dollar bid amount contained in the valuation question, where the bid amount
is  varied  across  the  respondents.  Compared  with  eliciting  the  WTP  in  an  open-ended
fashion,  this  method  is  particularly  likely to  reveal  accurate  statements  of value  as  the
format reduces  the ability  of the  respondent  to purposely  bias the  study  results  (Hoehn
and Randall). 4 Respondents  should also be more comfortable  with this take-it-or-leave-it
approach,  since  this  is the  situation  they usually  face in  the  marketplace.  With  the DC
approach,  instead  of  trying  to  identify  the  farmer's  profit  function  (which  would  not
include  any profit-independent  reasons  to accept  the program),  we simply need  to deter-
mine  whether  or not  the  farmer's  minimum  WTA  is  less  than  or  equal  to  the  offered
payment  incentive.
The  farmer's  decision  process  is  modeled  using  the  random  utility  model  approach.
From the utility theoretic  standpoint,  a farmer is willing to accept  $C to switch to a new
production practice  if the  farmer's utility  with  the new  practice  and  incentive payment
is at least as  great  as  at the  initial state,  that is, if U(O,y;x)  - U(l,y  +  C;x), where  0 is
the base  state;  1 is the  state with the WQIP practice;  y is farmer  i's income;  and x is  a
vector  of other  attributes  of the  farmer  that  may  affect  the  WTA  decision.  C can  be
written  as  C* +  8, where  8 is  state 0  pecuniary  costs  less  state  1 pecuniary  costs,  and
where  C*  is the  government's  incentive payment.  Hence,  C can be  considered a  "net"
incentive payment.  Note that  8 can be positive; due to some nonpecuniary costs, a farmer
may not have switched to the preferred practice even if 8 is positive.  The farmer's utility
function  U(i,y;s) is unknown because some components  are unobservable to the research-
er  and,  thus,  can be considered  a random variable  from the researcher's  standpoint.  The
observable  portion  is  V(i,y;x),  the  mean  of the random  variable  U(.).  With  the addition
of an  error  ei,  where  ei is  an independently  and  identically  distributed  random  variable
with zero  mean, the farmer's  decision  to accept  $C  can be reexpressed  as
(1)  V(0, y; x)  +  e°  < V(1, y  +  C; x)  +  1.
The most prevalent  functional form  for the  indirect  utility function  in the  dichotomous
choice  CVM  literature  is  V(i,y;x)  =  y +  ay,  where  a  >  0,  for  i  =  0,1.  Using  this
functional form, the farmer is willing to  accept $C for the change  if -P +  ay +  eo  y
+  ay+C) +  1.
The decision to accept  $C can be expressed  in a probability  framework  as Prob{WTA
'  C}  =  Prob{VI  +  e° '  V1 +  e1}  =  Prob{e°  - e1 c  V  - V0}, where  V  - V°  =  y  +
aC, and  y = y  - 7.  Because  Ai  =  V  - V  =  y  +  aC is  generated  directly from the
utility  model  given above,  it is  compatible  with utility  maximization.  The probabilities
of participation  in the program  given a  schedule  of incentive payments  can be obtained
as P, = FE(Ai).5 Because rates  of adoption at a particular  incentive  payment value  may
vary among the practices, from a cost effectiveness  standpoint,  the optimal rate of adop-
tion may not be  the same across  the practices.
4 While  willingness  to  pay  (WTP) questions  are  considered  to  be incentive  compatible  in the referendum  format,  some
capacity  for strategic  response  bias (in  both the  upper and lower  directions)  may still  exist with  WTA questions.  However,
we  believe  that  the  WTA  questions  analyzed here  may  be more  incentive compatible  than  many WTP  survey  questions.
Some  level of  incentive  compatibility  is  likely  as,  given  that  the  survey  was  administered  by  the USDA,  many  of the
respondents  may quite rationally  believe that  their responses  may  influence  the policy setting.  If so, then exaggerating  their
WTA can  suggest  to the government  that the program is too expensive  and increase the probability that  the program will  be
dropped or  reduced  in magnitude.  Underreporting  WTA  can result  in the  program being  accepted  by  the  government  but
with offered payments lower  than their reservation price.
5 Hanemann  (1984,  1989)  provides  formulas  for estimating  mean  WTA.  For  this  article,  the  median  (and  mean  if we
assume that WTA  can be less than  zero  as well) is  -yla.
32  July 1997Farmer  Adoption of Water Quality Protection Practices  33










Soil moisture  testing
(SMTST)
Tillage  system in which at least  30% of the soil  surface is  covered by
plant residue  after planting  to reduce  soil erosion  by water;  or where
soil  erosion  by wind is  the primary  concern,  at least  1,000  pounds per
acre  of flat small  grain residue-equivalent  are on  the surface during  the
critical erosion  period.
Pest control  strategy  based on the  determination  of an economic  thresh-
old that indicates  when  a pest population is  approaching  the level  at
which control  measures  are necessary  to  prevent a  decline in net re-
turns. This can include  scouting,  biological  controls,  and  cultural  con-
trols.
Nutrient management practice  involving  the estimation  of the amount of
nitrogen  available  for crops from previous legumes  (e.g.,  alfalfa,  clo-
ver,  cover crops)  and reducing  the application  rate of commercial  fer-
tilizers  accordingly.
Nutrient management practice  which accounts  for the  amount  of nutrients
available  for crops  from applying  livestock or poultry manure  and re-
ducing  the application rate  of commercial fertilizer accordingly.
Irrigation  water management practice  in which tensiometers or water ta-
ble monitoring  wells are  used to estimate the  amount  of water avail-
able  from subsurface  sources.
Data Description
The  1992 area studies project  is a data collection  and modeling effort undertaken jointly
by  the  Economic  Research  Service  (ERS),  the  U.S.  Geological  Survey  (USGS),  the
National Agricultural Statistical Service  (NASS), and NRCS. For  1992, data on cropping
and tillage practices and input management  were obtained  from comprehensive  field and
farm level surveys of about  1,000 farmers  apiece for 1992  cropping practices  in each of
four critical watershed regions:  the eastern Iowa and Illinois basin areas, the Albermarle-
Pamlico  drainage area covering  Virginia and North Carolina, the Georgia-Florida  coastal
plain, and the upper Snake River basin area. These study areas were selected from within
the  set of USGS's  National  Water Quality  Assessment  (NAWQA)  sites.
Information  about the extent of the farmers'  current  use of the  preferred  practices  as
well as their willingness to adopt these practices, if they do not currently use the practice,
were provided by a supplemental questionnaire.  Respondents  to the comprehensive  ques-
tionnaire  were  asked  to complete  and  mail in  this  additional section.  For the final  anal-
ysis,  1,261  observations were available.  No participants  in existing WQIP programs were
found  among  the  survey respondents.  The  practices  analyzed  here,  a  short  description
(as provided  in  the survey,  excluding  the  sentences  on the incentive payment  levels)  of
each, and  the current incentive payment levels  are presented in table  1.
All of these practices  are currently being supported by WQIP  For the WTA question,
the bids (per acre) offered  for all of the practices  except conservation tillage are ($2,  $4,
$7,  $10,  $15,  and  $20).  For conservation  tillage the bids  are ($4,  $6,  $9,  $12,  $18, and
$24).  The bid ranges  were  chosen to cover what we  perceived to  be the likely range of
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Table 2.  Definition  of Explanatory Variables
Variable  Description  Mean  SD
BIDVAL  Bid offer ($)  in the WTA  question  6.78  8.45
TACRE  Total areas  operated  1,112.09  1,624.04
EDUC  Formal education  of operator  3.20  1.39
FLVALUE  Estimated  market value per  acre  of land  1,354.35  689.36
EXPER  Farm operator's  years of experience  24.84  12.87
BPWORK  Number of days  annually operator  worked off the  43.51  86.28
farm
NETINC  Operation's  net farm income  in 1991  28,108.40  20,443.19
SNT  Soil nitrogen test performed  in  1992  (dummy)  0.10  0.31
TISTST  Tissue  test performed  in  1992  (dummy)  0.03  0.17
CONTILL  Conservation tillage  used in  1992 (dummy)  0.47  0.50
PESTM  Destroy  crop residues  for host free zones  0.13  0.32
(dummy)
ANIMAL  Farm type beef,  hogs,  sheep (dummy)  0.22  0.41
ROTATE  Grasses  and legumes  in rotation  (dummy)  0.05  0.22
MANURE  Manure  applied to  field (dummy)  0.15  0.36
HEL  Highly erodible  land  (dummy)  0.19  0.39
IA  Eastern  Iowa or Illionis basin  area (dummy)  0.72  0.45
ALBR  Albermarle-Pamlico  drainage  area (dummy)  0.09  0.29
IDAHO  Upper Snake River basin  area (dummy)  0.12  0.33
WTA.  The bids  were  randomly  assigned  with  equal  probability  to  the  surveys.6 The
specific  DC-CVM  question asked of the  farmer is  "If you don't use this practice  [listed
in the question]  currently, would you adopt the practice if you were given a $[X] payment
per acre?"  (Answer  yes or no.)  The sample  selection  equation,  which  identifies  current
users  at the  $0  payment,  is  "Is  this practice  [listed  in the  survey]  currently  in use  on
your  farm?"  (Answer  yes  or  no.)  The  appendix  provides  a more  detailed  facsimile  of
the  set  of  contingent  behavior  questions  as  well  as  the  question  designed  to  identify
current users  and  the number of acres  on which  they use the practice.
Explanatory  variables  are  defined  in table  2. Deciding  which  farm activity  variables
to include  in the  regressions  for each of the practices  was based  on whether or not the
variables  appeared justified  from a farm  management  standpoint.  For instance,  soil ni-
trogen testing  (SNT)  is  not included  in the  regressions  for  integrated  pest management
(IPM), since the former  should have little to do with the latter.  On the other hand,  highly
erodible  land  (HEL) is  included  in the regressions  for conservation  tillage  (CONTILL)
because  one  would  expect  that  farmers  are more  likely  to  adopt  it  on highly  erodible
land.  A priori,  economic  theory does not give much of a guide as  to what the expected
sign of most demographic variables will be in the adoption equations.  Nonetheless,  since
they  can add to the predictive power of the regressions,  they are included.  In sum, except
for income  and  price  (bid variable),  which  are  automatically  included  in  all the regres-
sions, every variable  available from the USDA survey that was significant in at least one
regression  was included  in the regressions,  subject to  the proviso  that the variable make
some  sense from  a farm management  standpoint.  Table  2  presents  sample  statistics  for
these variables  for all the farmers  in the  sample.
6 The  survey  procedures  in place  did not  allow  a more  complex  allocation  of bids.  See  Cooper  and Kanninen  for other
possible  survey designs.
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Because the survey sampled some regions at higher rates than others (e.g., noncropland
areas were sampled at lower rates than cropland areas), the data were scaled by sampling
weights. Not  accounting  for this exogenous  stratified  sampling  could lead to biased co-
efficient  estimates.  Multiplying  the  data  by  the  weights  gives  greater  weight  to  obser-
vations that  have  a lower probability  of being  selected  and less  weight to  observations
with  a higher probability  of being  selected.  For  estimation,  the  weights  are multiplied
by the sample  size and divided by the sum of the weights so that the sum of the weights
across the observations  is the sample size (Greene  1992). Performing weighted estimation
without scaling the weight  variable in this  manner can result in very  low standard errors
and,  thus,  very high t-statistics  for the estimated  coefficients  (Greene  1992).
One-Way-Up  Model
Ideally,  in pooling  the revealed and  stated preference  data,  the user and nonuser  groups
should have the same utility function  and associated coefficients  (Adamowicz,  Louviere,
and  Williams),  when  adjusted  for differences  in variances  between  the  two  groups,  al-
though  a  case  can  be  made  that  this pooling  is  useful  even if the  two  groups  are  not
equivalent  (see  footnote  2).  In  general,  one  can test  this  hypothesis  with  a likelihood
ratio  test,  namely,  LR  = -2*(LLr  - LLU),  on the  adoption equation log-likelihood  (LL)
estimates  for current  nonusers  (LL1), current  users  (LL2), where  unrestricted LLr = LL1
+  LL2, and  an equation pooling both groups  (LLr).  However,  since there  is no variance,
by definition, in  the dependent variable for current  adopters,  this  test is not possible  (for
current nonadopters,  on the  other hand,  we have responses  to the offered bids).  Instead,
to test the equality of parameters between users and nonusers, we used the LR test above
on  GLS  regressions  for users,  nonusers,  and  pooled  users  and  nonusers,  in  which  the
dependent variable  is acres on which the practice is applied (stated acres for respondents
who are current nonusers  or actual acres for respondents  who are current users) and the
explanatory variable  sets  are those from table 4. When we adjust for variance differences
between users  and nonusers,  the  null hypothesis  of parameter  equality  between  the two
groups  cannot be  rejected  for four of the five  practices  tested  (the null hypothesis  was
rejected for CONTILL). 7
Although the  likelihood ratio  tests  suggest that  the two  groups may have similar  co-
efficients,  we  cannot  use traditional  probit  to  estimate  the  adoption  equation.  Because
the  CVM  question  is  asked  only  to  nonusers,  the probability  of a  yes  response  to  the
hypothetical  bid  is  conditional  on  the nonusers  already  replying  no to  the  $0  offer  (as
implied by their answer to  the first question,  which  asked them if they currently use the
practice).  On  the  other  hand,  the  Prob(accept  $0)  for  current users  is  implied  by  the
response to the first question and is unconditional.  In other words, for nonusers, Prob(yes
to  hypothetical  $BidJ) = Prob(WTA  '  Bidi I WTA  > $0  ). Given  this conditional  prob-
ability  (i.e.,  we  already  know  that  nonusers  will  not  accept  the  $0  bid  offer),  the  in-
equality  Prob(yes  to hypothetical  incentive offer greater than  $0|WTA  > $0)  <  Prob(yes
to  $0)  can  occur,  a direction  of inequality  which  does  not  suggest  WTA  in  a  simple
7The  assumption  for the error term is var(e,)  =  2eoo+v
z i,  where  z  =  1 if nonuser  and z  = 0  if user.  The test  results  are
available from the author.
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single-bound  framework.  Hence,  to  avoid  biased  regression  coefficients,  the  adoption
model  must consider the conditionality  of the hypothetical  responses.
That the  Prob(yes)  to the  CVM  question is conditional  on a Prob(no  to $0),  suggests
a two-step  or one-way-up  (OWU)  model for the MLE.8 For an  early  example of a mu-
litple-bound  model  (in this  case  double  bound) for purely hypothetical  data,  see Hane-
mann,  Loomis,  and  Kanninen.  In our OWU context,  there  are three  possible responses
and probabilities  of those responses:
1.  Yes  (i.e.,  respondent is  a current  user,  at $0 bid); Pyes = Prob(WTA  <  $0).
2.  No-Yes  (the respondent  is not a current user  [at $0  bid] but  says yes  to the hypo-
thetical  offer);  Pno-yes = Prob($0  <  WTA  <  $bid) = P(WTA  < $bid) - P(WTA
- $0).
3.  No-No  (the respondent  is not  a current  user  [at $0  bid]  and  says  no to  the hypo-
thetical  offer);  Pno-no = Prob($0  <  WTA  and  WTA  >  $bid) = P(WTA  >  $bid).
Given  these possibilities,  the likelihood  function for this one-way-up  model:
n
(2)  L  =  I  pli pit  pNNi
yesi no-yesi  no-noi
where  IY,  INY,  and INN are  the  binary  indicator  variables.  Assuming  a normal  distri-
bution,  the gradient  is, summed  from i =  1 to  n,
N
(3)  aLn L/a3 = E  [IYi(P'xoi))iD)(f'xo,)]xoi +  [INY,/((f'xi) - D(P'xO,))]
i=1
X  [(P'xi)Xi - (P'xoi)Xoi] - [INN,(P'xi)/(1  - (3'xi))]x,,
where x0 o is the (lxk) vector of explanatory  variables where Bidi = $0 Vi,  xi is the (kxl)
vector of explanatory  variables,  and Bidi = hypothetical  value  for current nonusers  and
$0 otherwise. 9
The likelihood function  and the  analytic  gradients  were programmed  into Gauss Ver-
sion 3.1  and the Gauss Maxlik package was  used for estimation.  The one-way-up  results
are presented in table 3. The coefficient on BIDVAL  is of the correct sign and significant
at the  1%  level  for all  the  practices.  With  t-statistics  of  10  to  14,  the  bid  coefficients
indicate that BIDVAL  strongly outperforms the other explanatory variables in explaining
adoption.  This  strong  performance  is  not  surprising  since  all  the  respondents  to  the
contingent  questions,  in particular,  are  directly  responding  to  the  bid  value.  No  other
coefficients  were  significant  across  all  the practices.  FLVALUE,  the value of the market
value of the land  per  acre,  was  significant  and  negative  for four  of the  five practices,
suggesting  that farmers  with  higher value  lands  may  see  the offered  practices  as detri-
mental  to  profitability,  though  only  by  a small  amount  since  the  coefficients  are quite
small.  NETINC,  net income,  is  significant  in only  two  cases,  and  the  sign  is  positive.
However,  little can be  said about  this  performance  as,  a priori,  it is  difficult  to  predict
the  signs  of NETINC (and FLVALUE).  Note  that the  correlation between  NETINC and
FLVALUE is low for our data sets.  TACRE,  total acreage,  was significant only for IPM,
indicating  that farm size  is not a good predictor  of adoption of most BMPs, though  one
8The  "one-way-up"  name  refers to fact that the model proceeds to the next (higher)  bound only if the answer  to the first
bound  is no.
9  Using  more  explicit  notation than  in equation  (2),  the log-likelihood  function is lnL  =  " IYln[(f/3'x0 o)]  + INYJln[((lt'xi)
-((P'xo,)]  + INN,[ln(l-((f'xi)].
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Table 3.  One-Way-Up  Adoption Model  Combining Current Users  and Nonusers
Coefficient  Estimates
Variables  CONTILL  IPM  LEGCR  MANTST  SMTST
CONSTANT  -21.34  -107.1  -159.5  -206.2  -110.5
(-0.8)  (-5.4)  (-5.8)  (-7.5)  (-4.8)
BIDVAL  2.82  3.52  2.23  4.36  5.85
(11.4)  (13.1)  (10.0)  (11.4)  (13.6)
EDUC  0.51  21.14  16.68  9.86  4.57
(0.2)  (7.3)  (5.7)  (3.1)  (1.4)






EXPER  -0.30  -0.30  0.04  -0.30  -0.65
(-1.0)  (-  1.0)  (0.1)  (-0.9)  (-1.9)
PESTM  0.17  41.37
(0.0)  (3.7)
ROTATE  5.79  11.19  32.33
(0.3)  (0.6)  (2.0)
MANURE  -12.25  - 18.34  27.62
(-1.3)  (2.0)  (2.7)
ANIMAL  -4.11  -27.83  -1.35  30.91  -11.28
(-0.4)  (-3.6)  (-0.2)  (3.5)  (-1.2)
TACRE  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
(-1.0)  (1.8)  -0.7  (-0.1)  (-0.2)
FLVALUE  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01
(0.0)  (-2.1)  (-3.6)  (-3.5)  (-2.4)
IA  69.97  15.63  116.49  105.13  -27.47
(3.5)  (1.0)  (5.4)  (5.0)  (-1.7)
ALBR  71.09  -13.15  -14.59  12.53  -118.5
(2.7)  (-0.6)  (-0.6)  (0.5)  (-5.6)
IDAHO  27.82  -37.17  55.14  7.21  21.00
(1.3)  (-1.9)'  (2.3)  (0.3)  (1.2)
BPWORK  -0.07  -0.10  -0.12  -0.07  -0.06
(-1.4)  (-2.2)  (-2.7)  (-1.4)  (-1.1)
NETINC  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
(1.9)  (0.8)  (-1.2)  (-1.1)  (3.5)
Sum lnL  -751.6  -935.4  -857.7  -637.6  -676.5
%CUser  74.9  70.7  73.4  92.4  91.0
%CAd  82.1  79.6  85.5  88.8  85.5
Note:  The figures in parentheses  are  coefficients/standard  errors.  The numbers  of observations for each
regression  are  1,059;  1,021;  1,024;  1,010; and  1,006;  respectively.  Coefficients are  scaled up by a factor
of  100 for ease  of presentation.
could  expect the  scale of farm  operation  to  be an important  determinant  of adoption  of
IPM.
The  statistic  %CUser is  the  percentage  of the  time  the  estimated  model  correctly
predicts  whether or not  the farmer is  a current user of the practice,  while  %CAd is the
percentage  of correct  predictions  (where  the  nonadoptor's  response  to  the  offer is  the
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Figure  1.  Response  curves  for the subsidized  practices  (analysis  of  actual users  combined  with
CVM survey  data)
"true"  value) of adoption for current nonadoptors.  Using the estimates  of the ys (0.663,
-0.516,  -0.564,  -1.362,  and  -1.454,  respectively,  for each  practice),  the  coefficient
estimates  on BIDVAL (a)  in table 3, and the equation in footnote 5, the estimated median
WTAs  are -$23.51,  $14.65,  $25.28, $31.26,  and  $24.86, respectively  for each practice.
The negative  sign on  the  median  WTA  for CONTILL  suggests  that  farmers  would  be
willing to pay  to  continue using  the practice.  Given  that over 70% of farmers  surveyed
currently use this practice without any payment,  and given their investments in machinery
are necessary  for this practice,  this result  is not surprising.
Figure  1 graphs the  percentage  of farmers  adopting  the practices  as  a function  of the
offered incentive payment. Current levels of adoption of the practice are shown vertically
on  a line  through  the  $0  incentive  offer.  IPM and LEGR  have  flatter  response  curves
than MANTST  and  SMTST,  indicating  less sensitivity  to the offer values.  Given its high
current  use  among  farmers,  CONTILL has  the  flattest  response  curve,  even  though  it
does not have the smallest BIDVAL coefficient.  These results can be compared with those
from doing a single-bound  (SB) probit regression only on the hypothetical data and then,
given the  estimated  coefficients,  predict  the  number  of current nonusers  who  adopt  at
each offer  price  and  then  add  them to  the number  of current users  to  come  up with  a
schedule  similar to  that in  figure  1. For  example,  the  number of farmers using  conser-
vation  tillage  at the  $10  offer is  the  number of farmers  who  currently use the  practice
plus the number of current nonusers who will adopt the practice with a bid offer of $10.
In figure 2, the SB probit results predict lower enrollment levels for any  given bid offer,
except  the  lowest  ones,  compared  with  the  one-way-up  model.  For  example,  based on
the  SB  results, LEGCR,  MANTST,  and SMTST  all need greater than  $45  incentive pay-
ments to  reach  50%  adoption,  while  with  the combined  actual-hypothetical  results, no
practice requires  greater than approximately  $31  per acre  to achieve 50%  adoption.  En-
rollment at the $0 bid offer is higher in figure 2 as the SB  probit model predicts positive
enrollment by current nonusers  at $0 bid-a result which  can only be defensible if some
current  nonusers  who  where  uninformed  of the  BMPs  before  are  now  informed  about
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Figure 2.  Response  curves for the subsidized  practices (analysis of CVM survey data only)
them and  may use  them  even  at $0 bid-while  the  OWU  model predicts  only current
(actual)  use at $0  bid and hence  is more conservative.
Continuous  Model  Combining the  Actual  and Hypothetical  Data
The next step is to incorporate the one-way-up results into a continuous model regression,
a regression  with  acres  on which  the practices  are used as  the dependent  variable.  Spe-
cifically,  the dependent  variable is stated acres allocated  to the practice  for current non-
users  of the practice  and actual acres allocated  to  the practice  for current  users,  which
for farmer i can be stated as:
(4)  PACRESi  = zI 0 +  ui,
where  PACRESi is  the  amount  of acres  in  the preferred  practice,  zi  is  a  vector  of ex-
planatory  variables,  and u, is  a disturbance  with  mean zero.  As with the discrete  choice
model,  the  decision  on  which  variables  to  include  in  the  regressions  for  each  of the
practices  was  based on whether  or not the  variables  appear justified from  a farm man-
agement  standpoint.  Since economic  theory  does not  suggest  any  a priori  reasons  why
the  PACRES  equation  should  have  different  explanatory  variables  than  the  adoption
equation,  the same  variables  are used.  To reduce  the potential  of some possible  form of
heteroskedasticity  associated  with  the  total  acreage  (TACRE)  variable,  PACRESi is  di-
vided by  TACREi for the regressions.
Ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  estimates  of (4)  may  be  biased.  Because  PACRESi is
only observed for the farmers who are current users or are willing to adopt at the offered
incentive payment,  the  sample for the  regression  equation  may not be drawn randomly
from  the population  who answered  the  survey,  implying  sampling  bias  due  to  omitted
PACRESi. In addition  to being potentially  biased, OLS  estimates are inefficient  (Greene
1990).  The  Heckit procedure  (Greene  1990)  can  be used  to  correct  (4) for nonrandom
sampling by using information from the one-way-up  qualitative variable regression.  Since
Cooper
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PACRESi is observed  only  when yi  =  1 (for current users  and  for hypothetical  users),
(4) should be rewritten  as:
(5)  E[PACRESi zi, in  sample]  =  E[PACRESi zi,  Yi  =  1],
= E[PACRESIzi,  ei  >  AV i],  or
= zi  + E[uei  i  AVi].
To  estimate  this  continuous  model  in  a  sample  selection  framework,  the  Mills  ratio
calculated  from  the  one-way-up  model  is  added  as  an  explanatory  variable  (Greene
1990).  Variables  which  are highly correlated  (using a  standard  of correlation  coefficient
greater  than  or  equal  to  0.5)  with  the  Mills  ratio  explanatory  variables  are removed,
resulting in  one  or two  variables being removed from  each continuous  model equation.
Because  the  dependent  variable  PACRES/TACREi is  censored  to  fall between  0  and
1, OLS estimation  of the  above Heckit model may be biased and inconsistent.  Hence,  a
tobit version  of the Heckit model  is estimated with  the lower  and upper  limits set at 0
and  1, respectively.  To  correct  for heteroskedasticity  between  users  and  nonusers,  the
variance  of the error term is var(e)  =  o2eylZi,  where zi  =  1 if respondent  i is a nonuser
and  0 if a user.1 0
The  tobit  model  results  are  presented  in  table  4.  For  four  of  the  five  BMPs,  the
coefficient  on BIDVAL  is significant  and of the  expected  sign, either through its impact
in  the  Mills  ratio  (as  in  CONTILL)  or  through  the  BIDVAL  (for  practices  LEGCR,
MANTST,  and SMTST).  Note that for the Mills ratio variable  A,,  aAIaBIDVALi is negative.
Based on  the  results  from  table  3,  the  negative  sign  on the  Mills  ratio  coefficient  for
CONTILL shows  the expected  result that an increase  in the cost  share  for conservation
tillage leads to an increase in the percentage  of total acres on which conservation  tillage
is  used.  For  the  other  BMPs,  since  the  Mills  ratio is  not  significant,  sample  selection
bias  is  unlikely  to  be  a  concern.  A  large  majority  of the  farmers  in the  sample  use
conservation  tillage,  while a minority of farmers use the other practices, which may have
some bearing  on producing significant  sample selection bias  in the former  but not in the
latter.  Of the other explanatory  variables,  none was significant for every practice,  imply-
ing that the relevant  set of explanatory  variables  differs for each practice.  For example,
the coefficient  on ANIMAL  was  significant  and negative for four of the five  cases,  sug-
gesting  logically  that farmers  with  animal  operations  are  less likely  to be  interested  in
using the  offered  practices.  However,  ANIMAL  is not  significantly  different  from  0  in
the manure  testing  (MANTST)  practice;  while  a positive coefficient  may be  predicted  a
priori,  a negative sign would have been quite  unusual. On the other hand, the coefficient
on  MANURE  (farmer  applies  manure  to  field)  is  significant  only  for MANTST  and  is
positive,  which is not  surprising as  one  could expect that farmers who  apply manure to
their  fields may have a strong interest in MANTST.
As expected,  since  a great  majority  of farmers  already  use conservation  tillage,  the
CONTILL equation is not particularly sensitive to the cost-share offer. An increase in the
cost  share from the current level of $0 to $10  results in only  2.6% more acres using the
practice.  On  the  other  hand,  for  manure  testing,  which  is  currently  used  by  a  small
10Note  that var(e)  cannot be written  as o
2evo+vlz  where zi  =  1 if respondent is a nonuser and 0 if respondent is  a user. In
the Limdep  6.0 (Greene  1992) tobit model with  heteroskedasticity  correction we  used,  yo needs  to be  set equal to  0 since  or
is  a free parameter  in this program,  and thus, the inclusion  of a constant  in the  variance of the error term model will cause
a singular covariance  matrix.
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Table 4.  Tobit Continuous Stage Regression for Acreage  under BMP
Coefficient Estimates








































































































































































































Notes:  The  figures  in  parentheses  are  coefficients/standard  errors.  Dependent  variable  =  (actual  or
hypothetical  acres the practice  is  used on)/(total farm  acreage),  where tobit lower and upper limits are
set  to 0 and  1, respectively.  Coefficients are  scaled up  by a factor of 100  for ease of presentation.
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percentage  of farmers,  an increase in the cost  share  from the current  level of $0  to $10
results in 13.3%  more acres  using the practice. Legume crediting (LEGCR) shows  similar
increases  over the same offer range, while  soil moisture testing  (SMTST)  shows an 8.4%
increase  and IPM a 2.4%  increase.
Conclusion
Using farmer responses  to CVM  survey  data from four watershed  regions  in the United
States,  I estimate  the  minimum  incentive payments  a farmer  would  accept  in order  to
adopt more environmentally  friendly best management practices.  In a departure  from the
traditional  CVM  survey  approach,  since data on actual users  of the BMPs (i.e., farmers
who  currently  use the  BMPs with  no  incentive payments  or,  in other words,  at  $0  bid
offers)  exist,  I  extend  the  traditional  CVM  survey  analysis  by  combining  this  actual
market  data with  the hypothetical,  or contingent behavior  analysis.  Doing  so,  I add  in-
formation  to  the regression,  thereby  most likely  increasing  the reliability  of the results
compared  with  that  from  the  contingent  behavior  survey  response  data  only.  From  a
policy  standpoint,  getting relevant farmers to  adopt the BMPs is likely the most difficult
hurdle. However, what also matters from an environmental  standpoint is how many acres
are  enrolled  in the  practice,  given  the  decision  to  participate.  Hence,  given  the  results
from the adoption  equations,  I also model the number  of acres  enrolled in the BMPs  as
a function  of the  incentive  payments.  As with  the  discrete  choice functions,  I  combine
the  actual and the contingent  behavior  data.
For the  data sets  used in this article,  adoption  rates predicted  with the combined data
model  are  significantly higher  over a  wide range  of offers  than those predicted  using  a
single-bound  probit  analysis  of the hypothetical  data only.  Hence,  using  the traditional
CVM  analysis  results  to  determine  payments  to  attain  a  given  level  of adoption  may
result in  overpayment.  Still,  the  high cost  to  the  government  of attaining  much higher
than current levels of adoption suggests that incentive payments may not be a particularly
feasible policy  option in this period of shrinking  agricultural  budgets. This hypothesis is
only  enforced  by the  somewhat  flat response  the bid  offers  in terms  of the  number  of
acres  enrolled  given  the  decision  to  adopt the  practice.  However,  we  need  more  infor-
mation on the valuation  of the  environmental  benefits of adopting the BMPs in order to
know  whether  the incentive  payment  schemes  can yield benefits  greater  than costs  for
any  of the  BMPs.  If incentive  payment  schemes  are  used to  promote  adoption,  basing
payments on the combined  data model instead of the contingent behavior data only model
can result  in substantial cost  savings for the government.
[Received October 1995; final version received January 1997.]
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Appendix:  Example  of  Survey Questions  for Adoption  of a Practice
a.  Is  this  practice  currently  in  use  on your farm?  [Enter 1 if Yes.  If No, please skip to
item e.]
b. When did you  begin using  this practice?  [Please enter approximate month and year,
for example 0190 for January of 1990.]
c.  Was  this  practice  cost-shared  when  you  adopted  it? [If YES  enter dollars per acre
(total cash share  for cols. 10-12). If NO leave blank.]
d.  On  how many  acres  do  you  use this  practice?  [Enter number of acres and skip to
item j.]
e.  Would  you adopt  this practice  if you  received  a $24/acre  incentive  to  do  so?  [Enter
1 if Yes.]
f.  How many acres  would  you apply this  practice  on?
Cooper